
















This study examines the empirical determinants of debt maturity structure across 
the size of Spanish firms. Our evidence offers support for the relevance of size, 
asymmetric information and asset to maturity to explain the debt maturity 
structure. The paper also provides evidence relative to the differences in 
explanations according to firm size. It is shown that debt maturity in small firms is 
higher when the slope of the interest rate term structure increases and for very 
low-risk and very risky firms. 
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Capital structure research has traditionally focused on explaining the incentives that 
lead large public corporations to choose particular financing policies. There has 
been less research on other characteristics of debt financing, such as debt maturity 
structure. Theories of debt maturity have focused on the roles of agency costs 
(Myers, 1977; Barnea et al., 1980), asymmetric information (Flannery, 1986; 
Diamond, 1991) and taxes (Brick and Ravid, 1985; Lewis, 1990). 
Empirical analysis has identified several factors that can affect a firm’s choice of 
debt maturity structure. These factors include the firm’s options for growth, the 
maturity of existing assets, the default risk, the level of asymmetric information, 
and the effective income tax rate of the firm. Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and 
Mauer (1996), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Ozkan (2000) have provided 
empirical evidence about the determinants of maturity structure of debt for large 
firms. Other papers have focused on small firms, such as Scherr and Hulburt 
(2001), and Berger et al. (2005)1. Antoniou et al. (2006) have examined the 
influence of the country’s financial systems and institutional aspects, analyzing the 
determinants of the debt maturity structure of French, German and UK firms. 
The evidence provided by these papers is mixed. Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes 
and Opler (1996) and Ozkan (2000) provide strong support for the hypothesis that 
firms with more growth opportunities in their investment sets tend to have more 
shorter-term debt. In line with Diamond’s (1991) prediction, Barclay and Smith 
(1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) find evidence of a 
nonmonotonic relationship between debt maturity structure and credit quality.2 The 
                                                 
1 This paper only tests the implications of the models of Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) concerning 
the effects of asymmetric information. 
2 Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) use a bond rating variable based on a firm’s S&P 
bond rating, while Scherr and Hulburt (2001) use Altman’s Z score (1968) as a measure of default risk, 
seeing as the debt of small firms is not rated. 
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evidence also provides strong support for the maturity-matching hypothesis, which 
predicts that firms match the maturity of their debt to that of their assets. 
Cuñat (1999) has provided evidence on the determinants of the maturity structure 
for a sample of 227 Spanish listed firms in the period 1983-1994. His results show 
that firms with higher growth opportunities shorten the maturity of their debt 
significantly, although there is no evidence in favor of signaling or tax models. 
Additionally, bigger firms and those with a greater degree of government 
participation present a higher maturity. Although this author also analyses the 
existence of an effect of size in the determinants of debt maturity, he uses only 
listed firms. More recently, two papers have analyzed the determinants of debt 
maturity in Spanish SMEs. García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano (2007) analyze the 
debt maturity structure of small and medium-sized firms in terms of the risk and 
return trade-off associated with the use of short-term debt (Jun and Jen, 2003). 
López-Gracia and Mestre-Barberá (2011) analyze the influence of the tax effect on 
SME debt maturity structure. 
Within this context, the present paper examines the factors that Spanish firms take 
into consideration when choosing the maturity of their debt, analyzing whether the 
validity of the agency cost hypothesis, the signaling hypothesis, the maturity-
matching hypothesis and the tax hypothesis varies according to firm size. The main 
contribution of the paper is that of analyzing the relevance of these explanations 
jointly for a large sample of small, medium-sized and large firms. As far as we 
know, there are no papers that have tested the validity of these explanations on a 
single sample that includes both large and small firms. Considering a single sample 
allows us to test the existence of a different validity for each of the explanations 
proposed in the literature in accordance with firm size.  
The results highlight the relevance of size, signaling and asset maturity 
explanations in explaining debt maturity. The firm’s options for growth, however, 
have no effect on its debt maturity structure. Moreover, the main difference when 
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considering firm size is the existence of lower validity with respect to the 
predictions of Diamond’s (1991) model for small firms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the validity of 
theoretical arguments as determinants of debt maturity. Section 3 describes the 
characteristics of the database and methodology employed, while Section 4 
discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Four non-mutually exclusive hypotheses have been put forward to explain 
corporate debt maturity structure: asset maturity, agency costs, asymmetric 
information and taxes. In what follows, we summarize these explanations, which 
are then tested by the empirical model. 
2.1. ASSET MATURITY 
Firms match their debt maturities to their asset maturities. If the maturity of debt 
is shorter than that of assets, the firm may not have sufficient cash available to pay 
its financial obligations when they are due. However, if debt has a longer maturity, 
the debt payments remain due when the cash flows from assets cease. Matching 
the maturities of assets and debt reduces these risks. Myers (1977) argues that the 
underinvestment problem can be mitigated by matching the maturity of liabilities 
and assets. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between debt maturity 
and asset maturity. 
2.2. AGENCY COSTS 
The agency costs of debt may influence corporate debt maturity. Agency costs give 
rise to an underinvestment problem. When a firm has future options for growth via 
a profitable investment opportunity set, the existence of risky debt in the capital 
structure means that the benefits from undertaking profitable investment projects 
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will go only partly to shareholders. Debtholders will share the benefit, because the 
probability of default is reduced by the investment projects. Since the benefit goes 
partly to debtholders, shareholders have incentives to reject positive net present 
value projects, thus leading to what is known as the underinvestment problem.  
Myers (1977) argues that a firm may control this underinvestment incentive by 
shortening the effective maturity of its debt, in such a way that debt matures 
before growth options are exercised. This explanation of debt maturity (called the 
agency-cost or contracting-cost hypothesis) suggests that firms whose value 
depends to a large extent on investment opportunities have an incentive to borrow 
short-term. Several papers have provided favorable evidence for this relationship, 
such as Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996) or Ozkan (2000). 
Agency problems between shareholders and debtholders may be particularly severe 
for small firms as a consequence of risk shifting and claim dilution (Smith and 
Warner, 1979). Smaller firms are less able to access capital markets (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988) and long-term debt markets seeing as the ratio of their 
collateralizable assets to future investment opportunities is relatively small (Whited, 
1992). Moreover, smaller firms are less able to issue public debt because they have 
a large fixed component of issuance costs. Like Myers (1977), Barnea et al. (1980) 
suggest that these problems may be reduced by issuing shorter-term debt. These 
arguments thus suggest that debt maturity varies directly with firm size. 
2.3. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
Diamond (1991) provides a model to explain why risky firms with long-term 
projects might use short-term debt under the existence of asymmetric information. 
Firms with favorable private information and low-risk (high credit ratings) may 
choose short-term debt at relatively low interest rates because the refinancing risk 
is small. Firms with favorable private information and intermediate risk may choose 
long-term debt at a higher rate to reduce their greater liquidity risk of being unable 
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to refinance the debt if they choose short-term debt. Since short-term borrowing 
exposes firms to the risk of excessive liquidations, firms with high-risk (low credit 
ratings) prefer long-term debt so as to reduce this refinancing risk. Firms with 
higher default risk may be unable to borrow long-term because of the high 
probability of bad projects. Thus, Diamond’s (1991) model predicts debt maturity to 
have a nonmonotonic relation with risk ratings. Very low-risk firms and very risky 
firms borrow short-term and firms with intermediate risks are more likely to borrow 
long-term. 
Several studies analyze the relationship between debt maturity and risk ratings. 
Barclay and Smith (1995) show a nonmonotonic relation between debt maturity 
and bond ratings. Firms with higher bond ratings tend to have more short-term 
debt than those with lower bond ratings. Firms without bond ratings have more 
short-term debt. More recently, Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Scherr and Hulburt 
(2001) also provide results in line with Diamond’s (1991) predicted nonmonotonic 
relationship. 
2.4. TAXES 
Brick and Ravid (1985, 1991) argue that the expected value of tax benefits 
depends on the maturity of debt when the term structure of interest rates is not 
flat, since the firm can default on its promised debt payments. Firms increase their 
value by increasing the amount of long-term debt. This is due to the fact that the 
interest tax shield on debt is accelerated by increasing the proportion of debt 
payments allocated to long-term debt. Similarly, Kim et al. (1995) demonstrate 
that a long-term debt maturity strategy maximizes investor tax-timing option 
value3. Consequently, debt maturity should vary directly with the slope of the term 
structure. 
                                                 
3 However, Lewis (1990) argues that taxes have no effect on optimal debt maturity if optimal leverage 
and debt maturity are chosen simultaneously. 
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Kane et al. (1985), on the other hand, show that the trade-off between bankruptcy 
cost and the costs of raising debt and the per-period tax-advantage of debt 
financing leads to an optimal debt maturity structure. These authors demonstrate 
that optimal debt maturity is negatively related to the tax advantage of debt. The 
empirically testable hypothesis is that a firm’s debt maturity increases as its 
effective tax rate decreases. 
Little favorable evidence has been shown for the tax hypothesis, receiving mixed 
support in Stohs and Mauer (1996). These authors find a negative relation between 
tax rate and debt maturity as predicted, although there is no evidence that the debt 
maturity structure is positively related to the slope of the term structure. Barclay 
and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996) and Ozkan (2000), on the other hand, 
find no evidence for the tax hypothesis. 
3. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION AND DATABASE 
We use the following model to investigate the determinants of the debt maturity 















  [1] 
where DEBTMAT is the debt maturity of firm i in the year t and the determinants 
are agency costs (GROWTH and SIZE), credit quality (DEFAULTRISK), maturity of 
assets (ASSETMAT), and taxation (TERMPREMIUM and TAXEXP).  20061995t tY  is a set 
of dummy time variables for each year that capture any unobserved firm-invariant 
time effect not included in the regression, νi is the firm effect, which is assumed 
constant for firm i over t, and ξit is the error term.  
To test the empirical determinants of debt maturity, we use a sample of Spanish 
firms during the period 1995-2006. The data come from SABI and consist of 
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financial statement data and ratios for over a million Spanish companies. We select 
non-financial corporations (firms with SIC 6000-6999 have been excluded) that 
have (1) more than 10 employees, and (2) data throughout the 12-year sample 
period to construct the variables used. We exclude firms reporting zero debt. 
Finally, the sample is made up of 39,603 corporations and 246,344 observations, 
although the number of observations varies depending on the variables used. 
SABI reports the amount of long-term debt payable in one year. To measure the 
maturity structure of a firm’s debt (DEBTMAT), we examine the percentage of the 
firm’s total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) that has a maturity 
of more than one year. Prior studies have used various measures of debt maturity, 
considering either a balance sheet approach or an incremental approach. Examples 
of the balance sheet approach are Scherr and Hulburt (2001), Barclay and Smith 
(1995) or Ozkan (2000). Scherr and Hulburt (2001) use two specifications, long-
term debt payable after one year to total debt, as in this paper, and weighted-
average debt maturity, reporting that differences in results between the two 
specifications of debt maturity are minor; Barclay and Smith (1995) use the 
percentage of long-term debt payable after three years to total debt; while the 
dependent variable in Ozkan (2000) is the ratio of debt that matures in more than 
five years to total debt. 
Guedes and Opler (1996) and Berger et al. (2005), on the other hand, use an 
incremental approach. Guedes and Opler (1996) consider the maturity of debt 
issues as the dependent variable, while Berger et al. (2005) use a sample on new 
loans to small businesses. The argument for using the maturity of new issues is 
that some questions about the determinants of debt maturity, such as signaling 
models of maturity choice, can only be properly tested using the incremental 
approach. However, the incremental approach is not well suited to testing theories 
that relate asset maturity to the average of the maturities of the firm’s existing 
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liabilities, since the term-to-maturity of an individual issue only provides 
information about incremental financing choices. 
We use a balance sheet approach in the present paper. This is driven primarily by 
the nature of the sample. Seeing as we are concerned with whether there are 
differences among the determinants of corporate debt maturity structure according 
to firm size, we need a dependent variable that can be measured for firms of any 
size. The balance sheet approach allows us to use a measure of debt maturity 
common to all firms. Moreover, the debate concerning the use of a balance sheet or 
incremental approach is of less importance in Spain. Garcia-Teruel and Martínez-
Solano (2007) show a high proportion of short-term debt with respect to total debt. 
For their sample of 11,533 small and medium-sized firms, 80.81% of total debt is 
short-term debt. We also find a high percentage of short-term debt in our sample, 
as will be seen in Table 1. If debt is mainly short-term, the limitations related to 
maturity structure approximation based on the ratio of long-term debt to total debt 
are less relevant. 
Growth options have usually been proxied by the market-to-book ratio (Barclay and 
Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; and Ozkan, 2000). 
Seeing as we consider non-quoted firms, it is not possible to measure a firm’s 
growth opportunities by the market-to-book ratio, as is usual in other papers. A 
way of measuring a firm’s growth opportunities (GROWTH) is to assess its past 
growth, assuming that firms that grow faster also have greater opportunities for 
future growth. We measure the ratios of current sales divided by prior sales 
(SALESGROWTH) and current assets divided by prior assets (ASSETGROWTH) to 
capture past growth. We also use the ratio of depreciation to total assets 
(DEPREC_TA) to measure the weight of intangibles, as in Scherr and Hulburt 
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(2001).4 Size, on the other hand, is measured as the natural logarithm of firm 
assets (LNASSETS) in constant 1995 thousands of euros.  
The predictions of Diamond’s (1991) model have usually been tested by using bond 
ratings to measure default risk, as in Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler 
(1996), and Stohs and Mauer (1996). As our database includes small firms whose 
debt is not rated, we have used Altman’s Z score (1968) as a measure of default 
risk (DEFAULTRISK) following Scherr and Hulburt (2001). Altman’s Z score is 
computed using five accounting ratios, with high values indicating a low probability 
of default: 
54321 0.16.03.34.12.1 XXXXXZ      [2] 
where: 
X1 = (current assets-current debt) / total assets 
X2 = retained earnings / total assets 
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes / total assets 
X4 = equity / total debt 
X5 = sales / total assets 
To test the nonmonotonic relationship between default risk and debt maturity 
predicted in Diamond’s model, we create two dummy variables. HIGH DEFAULT 
equals one if the firm has a negative value for the Z score, and zero otherwise; 
while LOW DEFAULT equals one if the Z score is above the 66th percentile, and zero 
otherwise. 
For the empirical test of the maturity matching, asset maturity (ASSETMAT) is 
computed by means of the ratio between property, plant and equipment and the 
annual depreciation (PPE_DEPREC). The idea underlying this measure is that longer 
                                                 
4 Another alternative is to consider the R&D expenses to total sales to measure growth-oriented 
investments. The number of firms for which we have this information drops considerably, providing 
 only 11,886 observations. The results for this variable are not significant.  
 11 
maturity assets will depreciate at a slower rate.5 A similar definition has been used 
by Ozkan (2000). 
To test the tax hypothesis, we measure the term structure of interest rates as the 
difference between the month-end yield on ten-year government bonds and the 
month-end yield on six-month government bonds (TERMPREMIUM). The data are 
obtained from the database provided by the Central Bank of Spain. To measure the 
effective tax rate, we use the ratio of income tax expense to total assets (TAXEXP) 
(Guedes and Opler, 1996). 
We have split the sample into small, medium-sized and large enterprises applying 
the criteria of firm size defined by the European Union in the Commission 
Recommendation of 3rd April 1996 (96/280/EC).6 A small firm is defined as an 
enterprise that has fewer than 50 employees but more than 10, and has either an 
annual turnover not exceeding seven million euros or an annual balance-sheet total 
not exceeding five million euros. Medium-sized firms are defined as enterprises that 
have between 50 and 249 employees, and have either an annual turnover not 
exceeding 40 million euros, or an annual balance-sheet total not exceeding 27 
million euros. Firms that exceed these limits are considered large enterprises. 
Table 1 presents mean values for debt maturity and independent variables. The 
first aspect worth highlighting is the low long-term debt of the sample of Spanish 
firms. Barclay and Smith (1995) report a percentage of total long-term debt of 
around 70%, versus 23.49% for the sample under study shown in Table 1. The 
division of the sample into small, medium-sized and large firms does not reflect 
significant differences in the percentage of total debt according to firm size. 
                                                 
5 Similar results are obtained when the variable PPE_DEPREC is multiplied by the ratio between 
property, plan, and equipment and total assets. 
6 This criteria was the one in force during the period covered by our study. On 6th May 2003, the 
Commission adopted a new Recommendation (2003/361/EC) regarding the definition of SMEs which 
replaced Recommendation 96/280/EC as from 1st January 2005. We have found that the results do not 
vary with the new classification of firm size. 
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However, the percentage of long-term debt is large in small firms compared to 
large and medium-sized firms. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The sample under study presents very high mean values of SALESGROWTH and 
ASSETGROWTH, especially for large firms. However, these mean values are altered 
by the existence of a small number of outliers. The median values for SALES 
GROWTH (ASSET GROWTH) are thus 6.99% (6.90%), 6.13% (6.17%), 8.16% 
(8.06%), and 9.40% (8.72%) respectively for the total sample, small, medium-
sized and large firms. According to the mean values of the DEFAULT RISK variable, 
large and medium-sized firms have higher default risk than small firms. 
Table 2 illustrates the relation between Altman’s Z score and debt maturity for the 
total sample and for small, medium-sized and large firms. As we can see in Table 2, 
the values of the ratio of total debt to total assets and the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses to total assets corroborate the 
classification of default risk obtained for Altman’s Z score. It can be observed that 
the level of total debt decreases with firm solvency, while profitability grows as 
solvency improves according to Altman’s Z score. The firms belonging to the lower 
solvency group (Z < 0) present a mean proportion of total debt to assets of 
121.96% and a profitability of -24.22%. However, for the group made up of the 
more solvent firms (Z ≥ 7), the level of total debt is situated at 35.26% and 
profitability at 19.82%. Moreover, the ratio of total debt to assets is monotonically 
decreasing according to Altman’s Z score, whereas profitability is monotonically 
increasing. This shows the validity of Altman’s Z score as a proxy of the financial 
strength of Spanish firms. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
As regards the analysis of the relation between debt maturity and default risk, it 
can be seen in Panel A in Table 2 that the mean value of long-term debt decreases 
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from a value of 39.00% for Z values between 0 and 1 to 18.28% for Z values 
above 7. Furthermore, the mean percentage of long-term debt for Z values below 
zero (firms with very high-risk) is 31.59%. These results are partially consistent 
with Diamond’s (1991) model since the average debt maturity is lower for firms 
with high default probabilities and for firms with low default probabilities with 
respect to firms with intermediate-range default probabilities. The firms with high 
risk, and consequently more debt maturity, are only those with negative values of 
Z. This relationship between default risk and debt maturity is similar to that 
obtained by Scherr and Hulburt (2001) for a sample of US small firms. The main 
difference is that firms with an Altman’s Z score higher than two have less 
percentage of long-term debt than the average (20.78% versus 23.49%), whereas 
Scherr and Hulburt (2001) show that firms with a Z score higher than six are the 
ones that have less debt than the average (43.5% versus 44.31%). 
This fulfilling of the predictions based on Diamond’s model (1991) is maintained 
when firm size is taken into account (Panels B, C and D in Table 2). The breakdown 
of the sample into subgroups according to firm size following the criteria of 
European Commission Recommendation 96/280/EC provides similar results to those 
already reported for the total sample. Small, medium-sized and large firms with low 
risk have lower than average long-term debt. Very high risk firms (Z<0), on the 
other hand, have less long-term debt than firms that present an intermediate risk 
situation (0≤Z<1). 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix. According to the arguments of asset 
maturity, debt maturity is positively correlated with the ratio between property, 
plant and equipment and the annual depreciation. The correlation of debt maturity 
with default risk is negative, highlighting less long-term debt as the solvency of the 
firm increases. The correlation between debt maturity and the tax rate is negative, 
in line with the arguments of Kane et al. (1985). The independent variables do not 
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present high correlations with one another, except for the variables used to 
measure the firm’s growth opportunities, i.e., sales and asset growth. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
4. RESULTS 
Debt maturity explanations are tested using panel data. Prior to testing, we use the 
Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) to identify the existence of 
individual effects. The null hypothesis of no unobserved heterogeneity is rejected. 
The Hausman test (1978) indicates that only the within-group estimation is 
consistent. 
Table 4 reports the results of the determinants of debt maturity structure. In a way 
that is inconsistent with the agency cost hypothesis, the coefficients estimated on 
the growth of sales [column (1)] and the growth of assets [column (2)] are not 
significant. This finding is in line with Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Scherr and 
Hulburt (2001), who do not find support for the prediction that debt maturity 
structure is inversely related to growth options. However, the ratio of depreciation 
to total assets [column (3)] has the expected sign. This ratio measures investment 
in fixed assets, which we expected to be negatively related to growth opportunities. 
Thus, firms that have more conflicts between shareholders and debtholders use a 
higher proportion of short-term debt to mitigate these conflicts. We find mixed 
results for the prediction that the debt maturity structure decreases as the 
proportion of growth options in the firm’s investment opportunity set increases. In 
keeping with the validity of the agency costs hypothesis, Cuñat (1999) finds that 
firms with higher growth opportunities shorten the maturity of debt. Our evidence 
should be interpreted with some caution due to the difficulties in correctly 
estimating growth opportunities as a result of not being able to use the market-to-
book ratio as a measure. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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The coefficients on size (LNASSETS) are positive in all the estimations. This means 
that larger firms have longer debt maturity structures. This result is consistent with 
the role of short-term debt in reducing agency problems between shareholders and 
debtholders that might be particularly severe for small firms. Barclay and Smith 
(1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Ozkan (2000) also provide evidence along 
these lines. To measure the economic significance of the influence of firm size on 
debt maturity structure, we estimated the percent change in the dependent 
variable that results from a one standard deviation change in the explanatory 
variable. Considering the coefficient on size in column (4) in Table 4, one standard 
deviation increase in size raises debt maturity by 35.28%. 
In columns (1) to (3) in Table 4, we report a significant and positive relation 
between firm quality and debt maturity. Seeing as an increase in Z corresponds to 
a reduction in default probability, this positive coefficient is in line with the use of 
longer-term debt when the default risk decreases. To test the implications of 
Diamond’s (1991) model, we build two dummy variables according to the level of 
default risk. The first dummy variable is HIGH DEFAULT, which takes a value of one 
if the firm has a negative value for Altman’s Z score, and zero otherwise. LOW 
DEFAULT is the second dummy variable and equals one if Altman’s Z score is above 
the 66th percentile, and zero otherwise. 
The results are shown in columns (4) to (6) in Table 4. The two dummy variables 
are significant and negative. These coefficients reveal that firms belonging to the 
category with the lowest credit score as well as those with the highest credit score 
borrow on a shorter term. This result is consistent with the nonmonotonic relation 
between debt maturity and default risk and provides evidence that is favorable to 
the implications of Diamond’s (1991) model. The coefficients in column (4) indicate 
that, all else being equal, debt maturity structure decreases by 2.37% and 8.66% 
respectively for a one standard deviation in HIGH DEFAULT and LOW DEFAULT. 
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The proxy for the asset maturity of firms, i.e., the ratio of net property, plant and 
equipment to annual depreciation expense, presents a positive and significant 
coefficient. Firms with longer-lived assets use longer-maturity debt. This implies 
support for the maturity-matching hypothesis, although the economic significance 
of the influence of asset maturity on debt maturity structure is only 0.39%. Cuñat 
(1999) also shows weak evidence on firms matching their debt maturities to their 
asset maturities. 
We find mixed evidence for the tax hypothesis. On the one hand, the tax 
hypothesis predicts an inverse relationship between debt maturity structure and the 
ratio of taxes paid to assets (TAX EXP). In line with this prediction, the coefficient of 
TAX EXP shown in Table 4 is negative and significant. From the coefficient in 
column (4), a one standard deviation in the ratio of taxes paid to assets decreases 
debt maturity by 6.34%. 
On the other hand, there is no clear evidence that debt maturity is positively 
related to the slope of term structure (TERM PREMIUM). The relationship between 
TERM PREMIUM and DEBTMAT is positive and significant only when growth 
opportunities are measured as the ratio of current sales divided by prior sales 
(SALES GROWTH). In this case, this finding would imply favorable evidence for this 
hypothesis. However, when growth opportunities are measured by ASSET GROWTH 
or DEPREC_TA, there is a negative and significant association between the term 
premium and debt maturity7. As a consequence of these contradictory results, our 
findings might be seen as providing modest support for the tax hypothesis. 
Whatever the case may be, the economic impact of this variable in the dependent 
variable is never higher than 1.67%. 
                                                 
7 This negative relationship between term premium and debt maturity was also the result obtained by 
Guedes and Opler (1996). 
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The findings for growth opportunities, maturity of assets and tax explanation are 
similar to those commented above when the dummy variables in columns (4) to (6) 
are used to test the predictions of Diamond’s (1991) model. 
4.1. DETERMINANTS OF FIRM DEBT MATURITY ACCORDING TO SIZE 
Tables 5 and 6 show the findings regarding the determinants of debt maturity 
structure according to firm size. The sample has been split applying the criteria 
defined by the European Union in Commission Recommendation 96/280/EC. Firstly, 
the basic model tested in Table 4 for the entire sample is applied in Table 5 to the 
three subsamples of small, medium-sized and large firms. Secondly, the results for 
the different validities of the explanations are shown in Table 6, where these are 
analyzed using interaction variables between the independent variables and the 
dummy variable SMALL. In columns (1) to (3), the dummy variable SMALL takes 
the value of 1 if the firm is a small-sized firm according to EU criteria, and zero 
otherwise. In columns (4) to (6), the dummy variable SMALL takes the value of 1 if 
the firm is a small or medium-sized firm according to EU criteria, and zero 
otherwise. These interaction terms allow us to analyze whether the determinants of 
debt maturity are equally valid in small firms versus medium-sized and large firms. 
For the sake of brevity, only the results obtained in columns (1) to (3) in Table 6 
are commented. 
INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE 
The results for the independent variables of the basic model are similar to those 
reported in Table 4. Evidence favorable to the expected relationships is found for 
the asymmetric information and maturity of assets hypotheses and mixed evidence 
for the agency costs and tax hypotheses. Since these findings have been 
highlighted previously, our comments focus here on the interaction terms. 
Our findings show that the main difference when comparing firms according to their 
size is the existence of a different effect of asymmetric information in smaller firms 
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versus medium-sized and large firms. The variables SMALL*HIGH DEFAULT and 
SMALL*LOW DEFAULT present a positive and significant coefficient. This sign 
underscores the presence of greater long-term debt for small firms that have very 
high or very low risk. Thus, although the predictions of Diamond’s (1991) model are 
fulfilled in smaller firms, they are fulfilled to a greater extent in large firms. This 
difference disappears almost completely when considering the differential effect of 
small and medium-sized firms versus large firms [columns (4) to (6)]. 
The differential effect of the interest rate term structure on smaller firms reveals 
that these firms consider term structure to be an important determinant of debt 
maturity. Only the debt maturity of smaller firms varies directly with the slope of 
the term structure of interest rates. For large firms, term structure has a negative 
influence on debt maturity. There is no differential effect, however, of tax expenses 
on debt maturity according to firm size. 
The estimations do not provide strong support for the agency cost hypothesis, the 
maturity-matching hypothesis or the tax-based hypothesis as explanations that 
vary between firms according to their size. No difference seems to exist in the 
validity of the agency cost explanation seeing as the coefficients SMALL*SALES 
GROWTH and SMALL*ASSET GROWTH are not significant. This shows that there is 
no differential effect of these variables that measure the growth opportunities on 
debt maturity according to firm size. However, a difference does exist if the growth 
opportunities are measured as the ratio of depreciation to total assets. The 
coefficient of SMALL*DEPREC_TA is positive. This suggests that smaller firms with 
more investment in tangible assets have longer-term debt, thus providing favorable 
evidence for the hypothesis that smaller firms with more growth opportunities 
control suboptimal investment incentives by shortening the maturity of their debt. 
The maturity matching hypothesis only shows the existence of a differential effect 
for smaller firms in some estimations of Table 6, highlighting the greater validity of 
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matching the maturity of assets and debt to reduce the risks of refinancing and 
liquidity in small firms. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the empirical determinants of a firm’s debt maturity structure are 
examined for a sample of 39,603 non-financial Spanish firms over the period 1995-
2006. The main contribution of the paper consists in analyzing the different validity 
of the empirical determinants of debt maturity structure for small, medium-sized 
and large firms. 
Our results show the relevance of size, asymmetric information and asset maturity 
in explaining debt maturity. Our findings are not significantly different to those 
reported for US firms. The main difference with respect to the institutional 
environment arises from the maturity of debt and not from the determinants. 
Spanish firms present a lower ratio of long-term debt to total debt compared to US 
firms. We find mixed evidence in line with the agency cost perspective that debt 
maturity is used to control conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
debtholders. On the one hand, smaller firms tend to use shorter-term debt. On the 
other, there is no support for the prediction that debt maturity is inversely related 
to proxies for growth opportunities. These mixed results are similar to those found 
by Stohs and Mauer (1996) or Scherr and Hulburt (2001) for US firms. We obtain 
evidence consistent with Diamond’s (1991) prediction of a nonmonotonic relation 
between debt maturity structure and probability of default. This result has been 
highlighted by Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Guedes and Opler (1996). We also find 
evidence in favor of the asset maturity explanation, as in Scherr and Hulburt 
(2001) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) for US firms or Ozkan (2000) for UK firms. 
Like Cuñat (1999), we provide evidence in favor of the asset maturity hypothesis 
and no clear support for tax arguments, the differences residing in the influence of 
growth opportunities and asymmetric information. As regards the effect of growth 
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opportunities, our result should be considered with caution, since we are not able to 
use the market-to-book ratio to measure firm growth opportunities. Cuñat (1999) 
finds that smaller firms tend to use shorter-term debt, as do we. However, this 
evidence is obtained considering only listed firms. García-Teruel and Martínez-
Solano (2007) show more solvent firms using higher proportional short-term debt, 
as do we. However, we also show that firms with the lowest credit score borrow on 
a shorter term. 
We likewise provide evidence relative to the differences in the explanations 
according to firm size. We show that the term structure of interest rates and the 
probability of default are the determinants that have a differential influence 
between small and large firms. Debt maturity in smaller firms is higher when the 
slope of the interest rate term structure increases and for very low-risk and very 
risky firms. This last result implies that the prediction of Diamond’s (1991) model is 
fulfilled to a greater extent in large firms than in smaller firms. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
The table presents the mean values of the dependent and independent variables. TOTAL DEBT is the 
ratio of total debt (short and long-term debt) divided by total assets. DEBT MAT is the percentage of the 
firm’s total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) that has a maturity of more than one 
year. SALES GROWTH is the ratio of current sales divided by prior sales. ASSET GROWTH is the ratio of 
current assets divided by prior assets. DEPREC_TA is the ratio of depreciation to total assets. LNASSETS 
is the natural logarithm of firm assets in constant 1995 thousands of euros. DEFAULT RISK is Altman’s Z 
score. PPE_DEPREC is the ratio between property, plant and equipment and annual depreciation. TERM 
PREMIUM is the difference between the month-end yield on ten-year government bonds and the month-
end yield on six-month government bonds. TAX EXP is the ratio of income tax expense to total assets. 
Firms have been split into small, medium-sized and large enterprises applying the criteria of firm size 
defined by the European Union in the Commission Recommendation of 3rd April 1996 (96/280/EC). 
 
 
 Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
TOTAL DEBT (%) 63.95 63.93 63.90 64.51 
DEBT MAT (%) 23.49 25.09 20.66 19.93 
SALES GROWTH (%) 121.71 24.67 42.77 1,589.56 
ASSET GROWTH (%) 440.81 18.05 102.27 7,064.51 
DEPREC_TA (%) 4.53 4.66 4.29 4.44 
LN ASSETS 8.01 7.37 8.92 10.60 
DEFAULT RISK 2.58 2.64 2.46 2.47 
PPE_DEP 18.34 16.49 22.56 17.22 
TERM PREMIUM (%) 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.28 
TAX EXP (%) 1.48 1.38 1.64 1.68 








Table 2. Debt maturity, default risk, and firm size 
The table presents the mean values of debt maturity according to various ranges of Altman’s Z score. TOTALDEBT is the ratio of total debt (short and long-term debt) 
divided by total assets. DEBTMAT is the percentage of the firm’s total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) that has a maturity of more than one year. 
PROFITABILITY is measured as earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses divided by total assets. Altman’s Z (1968) is the measure of default risk and is 
calculated according to Equation [1]. Firms have been split into small, medium-sized and large enterprises applying the criteria of firm size defined by the European Union in 
the Commission Recommendation of 3rd April 1996 (96/280/EC). 
 
 
 Z<0 0≤Z<1 1≤Z<2 2≤Z<3 3≤Z<4 4≤Z<5 5≤Z<6 6≤Z<7 Z≥7 
Panel A: Total sample          
DEBTMAT (%) 31.59 39.00 28.55 20.78 16.62 15.05 14.83 15.13 18.28 
TOTALDEBT (%) 121.96 80.38 71.82 62.32 52.74 46.71 43.94 42.77 35.26 
PROFITABILITY (%) -24.22 3.06 8.08 11.15 14.22 16.49 17.45 18.16 19.82 
No. of observations 4,889 22,232 70,597 75,610 42,254 17,244 6,606 2,861 4,051 
          
Panel B: Small firms          
DEBTMAT (%) 32.41 39.73 30.93 22.39 17.91 16.91 17.08 17.02 20.18 
TOTALDEBT (%) 126.49 80.63 71.85 62.49 52.78 46.62 43.69 43.63 35.44 
PROFITABILITY (%) -25.27 2.92 8.21 11.06 13.99 16.25 16.94 17.82 19.71 
No. of observations 3,262 14,450 43,922 48,935 28,368 11,247 4,302 1,907 3,015 
          
Panel C: Medium firms          
DEBTMAT (%) 29.61 37.88 24.55 17.86 14.40 12.00 10.77 11.43 13.18 
TOTALDEBT (%) 114.35 79.78 71.80 61.98 52.18 46.39 43.57 40.04 33.75 
PROFITABILITY (%) -21.95 3.27 7.96 11.25 14.58 16.59 17.99 18.41 21.35 
No. of observations 1,361 6,450 22,696 22,785 11,501 4,937 1,911 818 895 
          
Panel D: Large firms          
DEBTMAT (%) 31.72 36.12 25.11 17.64 12.01 9.54 9.97 11.06 9.97 
TOTALDEBT (%) 105.47 80.60 71.61 62.10 54.97 49.04 48.38 47.19 41.17 
PROFITABILITY (%) -23.03 3.61 7.38 11.61 15.28 18.57 20.40 21.42 12.36 
No. of observations 266 1,332 3,979 3,890 2,385 1,060 393 136 141 
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Table 3. Correlations 
The table presents the correlation matrix. DEBTMAT is the percentage of the firm’s total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) that has a maturity of more than one year. 
SALESGROWTH is the ratio of current sales divided by prior sales. ASSETGROWTH is the ratio of current assets divided by prior assets. DEPREC_TA is the ratio of depreciation to total 
assets. LNASSETS is the natural logarithm of firm assets. DEFAULTRISK is Altman’s Z score. PPE_DEPREC is the ratio between property, plant, and equipment and annual depreciation. 
TERMPREMIUM is the difference between the month-end yield on ten-year government bonds and the month-end yield on six-month government bonds. TAXEXP is the ratio of income 
tax expense to total assets. 
 
 DEBTMAT SALESGROWTH ASSETGROWTH DEPREC_TA LNASSETS DEFAULTRISK PPE_DEP TERMPREMIUM 
SALESGROWTH 0.0041* (0.0565)        
ASSETGROWTH 0.0089*** (0.0000) 
0.9715*** 
(0.0000)       




(0.1197)      






(0.0000)     








(0.0000)    










(0.4059)   
































Table 4. Determinants of firm debt maturity 
Regressions are estimated using panel data. The dependent variable (DEBTMAT) is the percentage of the 
firm’s total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) that has a maturity of more than one 
year. SALESGROWTH is the ratio of current sales divided by prior sales. ASSETGROWTH is the ratio of 
current assets divided by prior assets. DEPREC_TA is the ratio of depreciation to total assets. 
LN_ASSETS is the natural logarithm of firm assets in constant 1995 thousands of euros. DEFAULTRISK is 
Altman’s Z score. HIGHDEFAULT is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a negative value for 
Altman’s Z score, and zero otherwise. LOWDEFAULT is a dummy variable that equals one if Altman’s Z 
score is above the 66th percentile, and zero otherwise. PPE_DEPREC is the ratio between property, plant, 
and equipment and annual depreciation. TERMPREMIUM is the difference between the month-end yield 
on ten-year government bonds and the month-end yield on six-month government bonds. TAXEXP is the 
ratio of income tax expense to total assets. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 Expected sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 











SALES GROWTH - 0.0000 (0.68)   
0.0000 
(0.68)   
ASSET GROWTH -  0.0000 (0.21)   
0.0000 
(0.22)  
DEPREC_TA +   0.0769*** (8.04)   
0.0819*** 
(8.62) 















(2.24)    











































Hausman test  3,051.59*** 4,475.22*** 4,790.80*** 2,011.55*** 3,720.56*** 4,441.07*** 
F test  426.30*** 392.71*** 415.64*** 524.60*** 510.14*** 543.05*** 
# observations  214,830 232,024 246,344 214,830 232,024 246,344 




Table 5. Determinants of firm debt maturity according to size 
Regressions are estimated using panel data. The dependent variable (DEBTMAT) is the percentage of the firm’s total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) 
that has a maturity of more than one year. SALESGROWTH is the ratio of current sales divided by prior sales. ASSETGROWTH is the ratio of current assets divided by prior 
assets. DEPREC_TA is the ratio of depreciation to total assets. LNASSETS is the natural logarithm of firm assets in constant 1995 thousands of euros. HIGHDEFAULT is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a negative value for Altman’s Z score, and zero otherwise. LOWDEFAULT is a dummy variable that equals one if Altman’s Z 
score is above the 66th percentile, and zero otherwise. PPE_DEPREC is the ratio between property, plant, and equipment and annual depreciation. TERMPREMIUM is the 
difference between the month-end yield on ten-year government bonds and the month-end yield on six-month government bonds. TAXEXP is the ratio of income tax 
expense to total assets. Firms have been split into small, medium-sized and large enterprises applying the criteria of firm size defined by the European Union in the 
Commission Recommendation of 3rd April 1996 (96/280/EC). T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
   SMALL   MEDIUM   LARGE  
 Expected sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 

















SALES GROWTH - -0.0000 (-0.46)   
0.0000 










DEPREC_TA +   0.0916*** (8.83)   
0.1451*** 
(5.46) 
  0.0694 
(1.24) 






































































































Hausman test  1,489.02*** 1,878.11*** 2,354.12*** 594.08*** 683.72*** 1,013.67*** 240.44*** 194.64*** 50.51*** 
F test  381.41*** 361.24*** 382.54*** 172.08*** 169.00*** 180.83*** 37.58*** 38.00*** 38.81*** 
# observations  135,754 148,778 159,408 66,524 70,166 73,358 12,552 13,082 13,582 




Table 6. Determinants of firm debt maturity according to size 
Regressions are estimated using panel data. The dependent variable (DEBTMAT) is the percentage of the 
firm’s total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) that has a maturity of more than one 
year. SALESGROWTH is the ratio of current sales divided by prior sales. ASSETGROWTH is the ratio of 
current assets divided by prior assets. DEPREC_TA is the ratio of depreciation to total assets. LNASSETS 
is the natural logarithm of firm assets in constant 1995 thousands of euros. HIGHDEFAULT is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm has a negative value for Altman’s Z score, and zero otherwise. 
LOWDEFAULT is a dummy variable that equals one if Altman’s Z score is above the 66th percentile, and 
zero otherwise. PPE_DEPREC is the ratio between property, plant and equipment and annual 
depreciation. TERMPREMIUM is the difference between the month-end yield on ten-year government 
bonds and the month-end yield on six-month government bonds. TAXEXP is the ratio of income tax 
expense to total assets. Firms have been split into small, medium-sized and large enterprises applying 
the criteria of firm size defined by the European Union in the Commission Recommendation of 3rd April 
1996 (96/280/EC). T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 











SALES GROWTH 0.0000 (0.67) 
  0.0000 
(0.68) 
  
ASSET GROWTH  0.0000 (0.23) 
  0.0000 
(0.13) 
 
DEPREC_TA   -0.0507** (-2.59) 
  -0.0371 
(-0.86) 


































































SMALL*SALES GROWTH -0.0000 (-0.10) 
  -0.0000 
(-0.71) 
  
SMALL*ASSET GROWTH  0.0001 (1.34) 
  0.0000 
(1.20) 
 
SMALL*DEPREC_TA   0.1600*** (7.99) 
  0.1232*** 
(2.85) 























































Hausman test 3,587.06*** 3,980.28*** 5,215.08*** 2,484.51*** 3,792.64*** 4,535.02*** 
F test 392.19*** 386.71*** 415.33*** 382.67*** 378.17*** 402.86*** 
# observations 214,830 232,024 246,344 214,830 232,024 246,344 
# firms 37,442 39,196 39,603 37,442 39,196 39,603 
 
